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Abstract—The field of image composition is constantly trying
to improve the ways in which an image can be altered and
enhanced. While this is usually done in the name of aesthetics and
practicality, it also provides tools that can be used to maliciously
alter images. In this sense, the field of digital image forensics has
to be prepared to deal with the influx of new technology, in a
constant arms-race. In this paper, the current state of this arms-
race is analyzed, surveying the state-of-the-art and providing
means to compare both sides. A novel scale to classify image
forensics assessments is proposed, and experiments are performed
to test composition techniques in regards to different forensics
traces. We show that even though research in forensics seems
unaware of the advanced forms of image composition, it possesses
the basic tools to detect it.
Index Terms—Digital Image Forensics, Image Composition
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularization of digital cameras and the Internet have
made it easy for anyone to capture and share pictures. Current
research suggests, however, that people are not very keen on
discerning between real and edited pictures [1]. This poses a
critical problem, as softwares such as Adobe Photoshop [2]
and GIMP [3] allow anyone to easily create high-quality
composites. In such a scenario, how can one be sure that an
image is authentic and depicts a factual scene?
An arms race between forgers and forensics analysts is in
progress [4]. While new and more sophisticated forges are
being conceived, forensic techniques keep evolving to catch
them. Most image manipulations, however, are neither mali-
cious nor dangerous. There are plenty of legitimate reasons to
edit images, such as for marketing and design. Unfortunately,
sophisticated tools developed for these tasks can be used by
forgers and the analysts have to struggle to catch up.
In this paper, we analyze the current state of this arms race
between the field of image forensics and image composition
techniques. Here, image composition is used as an umbrella
term for all techniques from areas such as computer graphics,
computational photography, image processing, and computer
vision, that could be used to modify an image. More specif-
ically, we discuss works that have the potential to either be
used to perform or hide forges in digital images.
From a forensic point of view, image manipulation is usually
classified as either splicing, copy-pasting (also called cloning),
erasing, or retouching. A splicing operation consists of trans-
ferring an object from an image into another, but this could
be done simply by cutting and pasting, or using an advanced
technique that matches the gradient of the target image [5].
Copy-pasting is similar in essence, but the transferred object
comes from the same image. Retouching has a vague definition
that could fit a wide range of actions, such as blurring regions
of the image, recoloring, and applying filters.
While many modern image-composition techniques could
be used to make sophisticated forgeries, almost none of them
have been scrutinized by forensic works. There is, however,
a large body of forensic tools that could be used for this
task. This paper surveys both the forensics arsenal and image-
composition techniques to identify the best strategies to ana-
lyze these novel forgeries. We conclude that the field of digital
image forensics is prepared to deal with image composition.
The main contributions of this paper include:
• A novel scale for the different levels of forensics image
assessments (Section II);
• A new way to classify forensic techniques, combining
the two most used classifications in the literature with
the proposed scale (Section III);
• A new classification for image composition, extending the
existing types worked in the forensics literature (Section
IV);
• A theoretical and experimental analysis on image compo-
sition techniques from a forensics point of view (Sections
IV and V).
II. THE FORGERY DETECTION SCALE
According to recent surveys [4][11][12], there are two main
fronts to digital image forensics: source identification and
forgery detection. Source identification tries to link an image
to the device that took it. Acquisition traces are extracted
from the investigated image and then compared with a dataset
of possible fingerprints specific for each class/brand/model
of devices. Matching fingerprints are exploited to identify
the image source device. Forgery detection is concerned in
determining if and how a target image has been altered. In
the same sense, an image is provided for analysis, several
different image features and traces can be observed, and there
are different possible outcomes. This paper is focused on
forgery detection, but our findings can provide useful insights
for device identification.
Forgery detection mostly works twofold: either looking for
patterns where there shouldn’t be, or looking for the lack
of patterns where there should be. If someone, for example,
splices an object from an image into another, and resizes it
so it is in the same scale as the target picture; the resizing
operation now creates a pattern of correlation between its
pixels where there shouldn’t be one. On the other hand, the
target image had several patterns, such as its CFA (Color Filter
Array, explained on Section III-A), the illuminant color, etc.
which were disrupted by the spliced object.
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Fig. 1: Different ways in which composition techniques can be used to alter images. a) Removing soft shadows [6]. The hand
shadow from the top image has been removed on the bottom image. b) Inserting synthetic objects [7]. The marble angel in
the picture is not real, it was rendered into the scene along with its complex light interactions. c) Performing edge-aware
filtering [8]. The bottom image was filtered to perform a localized color editing on some of the stone statues. d-f) Morphing
two different objects together to create a blend [9]. The cat in Figure 1e is a composite of the cat in Figure 1d and the lion in
Figure 1f. g) Transferring an object from one image to another, adjusting its illumination according to the target scene [10]:
the building was spliced on the field in the top image, and in the bottom it had its lighting adjusted to match the composition.
The most simplistic view would pose that there are only
two outcomes for forgery detection: the image has been
altered, or no evidence of alteration is found. However, this
classification might not be sufficient. Simply compressing an
image might be considered an alteration, even though it is
a commonplace operation, making this classification useless.
Different forensic techniques work on different assumptions of
what traces could be present on the image and what they can
infer from them, from the location to the nature of the forgery.
There is no standard on the literature, however, for classifying
and comparing techniques based on their outcomes.
Here, we propose a new general classification scale called
the FD (short for Forgery Detection scale). This scale is based
in the concept of an image being native or not: a native
image is an image that was captured by a device and then
outputted to the user “as-is”. Conceptually, this is easy to
define, but technically there might be some complications:
different devices process the image differently. These problems
will be discussed in detail further in the paper.
The FD scale ranks forensic techniques based on the type
of evidence they can provide about an image’s nativity. The
first possible outcome is the negative case, when it is not
possible to determine if an image has undergone any form
of alteration. This could happen because the image is really
native, or because the analyzed traces do not show forgery, but
it makes no difference: it is not possible to say that an image
is truly native, only that there is no evidence supporting it to
be forged. This outcome falls outside our scale in practice,
but can be called FD0 for simplicity. The following are the
different levels of our Forensics Detection scale:
FD0 No evidence can be found that the image is not native.
FD1 The image has undergone some form of alteration from its
native state, but the nature and location of it is unknown.
FD2 The image has undergone some form of alteration from
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its native state and the location of the alteration can be
determined, but its nature is not known.
FD3 The image has undergone some form of alteration from
its native state, the location of the alteration can be
determined and the nature of it is known.
FD4 All the conclusions of the previous item, and a particular
tool or technique can be linked to the forgery.
These should be referred as FD (short for forgery detection)
scale, with values FD0-4. It could be argued that the ultimate
form forgery detection would go beyond identifying the used
technique, by locating a forger or even estimating the historic
of the image’s alterations [13]. It is a valid point, but they
are not common in digital image forensics and fall out of
this paper’s scope. The FD scale is backwards inclusive for
FD > 0, meaning that if FD4 can be guaranteed so can
FD3, FD2 and FD1. The following subsections provide in-
depth explanation of the different levels of the FD scale and
important considerations.
A. FD1: Nativity
The FD1 level differs from the negative case FD0 because it
is possible to determine that the image is not native. This is not
so simple to assess, as most modern cameras have a processing
pipeline comprised of several operations (demosaicing, white
balance, etc), changing the image before the user has access to
it. Furthermore, demosaicing is such a fundamental operation
in modern cameras that it makes little sense talking about
images without it. For the sake of generality, we propose that
any form of pre-processing on the image up until a single
compression can be accepted without breaching the image
nativity. In the cases where the capture device is known, a
forensics specialist can limit the scope of his analysis and
determine only some operations are valid. A forensic technique
achieves FD1 when it is able to find evidence of alteration after
capture. Techniques that analyze an image’s EXIF information
are an example of FD1: they can detect an inconsistency in
the metadata proving an image is not native, but nothing can
be said about location or nature of the alteration.
B. FD2: Location
The FD2 level is obtained when the general location of
the alteration in the image is known. It is possible that a
region of an image has been erased by a series of copy-pasting
operations, and then retouched with smoothing brushes. In
this case the boundaries of the forgery might no be as
clear. If a technique is able to obtain any form of speci-
ficity on the altered region, FD2 is achieved. This is the
case when analyzing traces such as PRNU (Photo Response
Non-Uniformity, Section III-A), CFA or ELA (Error Level
Analysis, Section III-B), that are locally structured on the
image. If evidence of any global alteration on the image is
found, such as median or bilateral filtering, then the location
of the forgery is the whole image. Similarly, operations that
remove parts of the image such as seam carving and cropping
can be detected but the actual altered area is not present in the
analyzed image anymore. It is argued that the forgery location
can be considered to be all image, reaching FD2.
C. FD3: Nature
The nature of the forgery can be subjective, because it is
not possible to predict all ways in which an image can be
altered. The most commonly studied forms of forgery such
as splicing, copy-pasting and erasing, are just a subset of
possibilities. As was discussed on the introduction, image
composition techniques are able to alter the shape, texture
and orientation of objects, and even merge them together. For
simplicity, any meaningful information in addition to location
of the processing that can be used to assist the forensics analyst
can be considered FD3. If an object has been rotated and
scaled, identifying any of these operations awards an FD3 level
on the scale. Identifying a spliced object is worth an FD3 on
the scale because the image is not native (FD1), its location
on the target image is evident (FD2), and the nature of the
alteration is known (FD3).
D. FD4: Technique
The highest level on our scale, FD4, is achieved when the
analyst finds evidences that can link the forgery to a particular
technique or tool. A splicing can be done by simply cutting
a region from an image an pasting over another, but there are
also sophisticated ways to blend them, such as Alpha Matting
or Seamless Cloning. A forensic technique that is able to,
after obtaining FD3, provide further insight into the technique
or tool used to perform the forgery achieves FD4.
III. THE FORENSICS ARSENAL
The current state-of-the-art on digital image forensics pro-
vides an arsenal of tools and techniques for forensics analysts.
In this section we investigate the most relevant approaches
and their capabilities, both in terms of applicability (i.e. when
we can use them) and assessment (i.e. the level that can be
achieved in the FD scale). In a general way, it can be noted
that there is a trade off between the generality and the FD level
that a technique is able to reach. This is intuitive, because the
higher the level on the scale, the more specific the assessments
are. FD1 can be simplified as a boolean statement (the image
is either native or not). From FD2 onwards, there is a large
set of possible answers (all different combinations of pixels in
the image). To identify the nature of the forgery in the image
(FD3), a technique must be looking for more specific features
or traces.
An image forensic tool is usually designed considering three
steps:
1) Some traces in the image - possibly introduced by the
forgery process - are identified; such traces can be scene-
level information such as “the image lighting”, or signal-
level, such as “the color filter array pattern”.
2) These traces are measured and quantified in some way,
resulting in features, which are usually numeric in nature;
3) By analyzing through experimentation how the set of
features behaves on native and forged images, a decision
is taken about the image. This can be done using simple
thresholds or sophisticated machine learning techniques.
In Table I we show a practical example of previous steps
for the technique developed by Carvalho et. al. [14] to detect
4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY
TABLE I: The steps of the tool by Carvalho et. al. [14].
Layer Example
Trace Illuminant or light
source of the image.
Feature Estimated illuminant colors
and light intensity on object edges.
Decision SVM classification.
Acquisition
Compression
Editing
CFA
Lens
PRNU
Double 
Quantization
JPEG
Ghosts
Misaligned
Blocks
ELA
Geometry
Lighting
Specific
Perspective
Reflections
Proportions
Lights
Illuminants
Shadows
Copy-Paste
Resampling
Seam Carving
Filtering
FD1
FD2
FD3
FD1
FD2
FD3
FD1
FD2
FD4
Fig. 2: Forensic techniques’ classification. Each type of trace
is organized under its correspondent phase on the forgery
process. The techniques themselves were omitted for the sake
of clarity, but would appear as leaf nodes under their analyzed
traces. On the left, the relation to the FD scale is displayed.
Only by analyzing specific editing traces it would be possible
to achieve FD4.
splicing. The used trace is the illuminant, or the light source.
The key observation is that if an object is spliced and the
original image had different light conditions, such as indoor
or outdoor lighting, or even incandescent vs. fluorescent lights,
this trace can be used to identify it. The features used are the
estimated illuminant colors and the light intensity on the edges,
for the different analyzed regions of the image. The decision
process uses a Support Vector Machine (SVM) to classify the
image as either spliced (FD3) or inconclusive (FD0) based on
the features.
Forensic tools classification is based on the traces they
analyze. Piva [12] distinguishes between traces left by three
different steps of the image formation process: acquisition,
coding and editing. Another intuitive classification has been
proposed by Farid [4] where the forensic techniques are
grouped into five main categories: pixel-based, format-based,
camera-based, physically-based and geometric-based. Farid’s
classification is more common in the literature and distin-
guishes better between traces, but Piva’s can be closely related
to the FD scale. We propose a classification based on Piva’s
approach (Fig. 2), but with greater specificity, similarly to
Farid’s.
The most relevant traces and correspondent tools developed
by the forensic community will be discussed in the following
subsection. The FD scale will be used to describe which level
of assessment can be expected when examining an image using
a specific tool.
A. Acquisition Traces (AT)
Native images come to life with distinctive marks (artifacts,
noise, inconsistencies) due to the acquisition process. Both
hardware (e.g., lens, sensor) and software components (e.g.,
demosaicing algorithm, gamma correction) contribute to the
image formation, introducing specific traces into the output
(native) image. When a native image is processed some
of these traces can be deteriorated or destroyed, exposing
evidence of tampering. Forgery detection using acquisition
traces generally falls in one of two categories:
1) Global: The analyzed trace is a global camera signature.
Non-native images can be exposed when this signature
does match with the supposed source device. For instance,
in [15] non-native JPEG images are exposed by analyzing
quantization tables, thumbnails and information embed-
ded in EXIF metadata. In [16] the reference pattern noise
of the source device is taken as a unique identification
fingerprint. The absence of the supposed pattern is used
as evidence that the image is non-native.
2) Local: The analyzed trace has a local structure in the
image. Its inconsistencies in some portion of the image
can be exploited to localize the tampering. For instance,
Ferrara [17] uses demosaicking artifacts that form due
to color interpolation. They can be analyzed at a local
level to derive the tampering probability of each 2×2
image block. Fridrich [18] reveals forgeries by detecting
the absence of the PRNU on specific regions of the
investigates image.
Let us note that some traces can be considered both at a
global or local level (e.g., demosaicing artefacts and PRNU),
allowing to identify non-native images (FD1) or to localize
forgeries (FD2). The analysis of acquisition traces is usually
limited to matching a known pattern, and they can be easily
disrupted. For this reason, FD2 is the highest we can expect to
achieve on the FD scale using acquisition traces. The analysis
of acquisition traces generally requires some additional infor-
mation about the source device. In some cases this information
depends on the source device model or manufacturer (e.g.,
color filter array pattern, quantization tables), and can be easily
obtained to assess image nativity [19]. In other cases these
traces are unique camera fingerprints (e.g. PRNU) and can be
obtained by having the source device available, or be estimated
by using different images captured by the same device.
B. Coding Traces
Lossy compression might happen in many occasions during
the life of a digital image:
• Native images of non professional cameras and smart-
phones usually come to life in JPEG format;
• when uploading a photo on a social network lossy com-
pression is usually applied to the image;
• when a JPEG image is altered and saved again in JPEG,
double lossy compression occurs.
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For this reason, most of the literature has focused on study-
ing the traces left by single and multiple chains of JPEG-
compression. This is a very prolific field of study in forensics,
with a wide variety of techniques. Fan [20] and Luo [21]
provide efficient methods to determine whether an image
has been previously JPEG compressed, and, if so, are able
to estimate some of the compression parameters. Further
advances have been also provided by Li et al. [22] to identify
high-quality compressed images basing on the analysis of
noises in multiple-cycle JPEG compression. On Bianchi’s
technique [23], original and forged regions are discriminated
in double compressed images, either aligned (A-DJPG) or non-
aligned (NA-DJPG) even when no suspect region is detected.
Yang et al. [24] propose an error-based statistical feature
extraction scheme to face the challenging case where both
compressions are based on the same quantization matrix.
In most cases the analyst can exploit coding traces to dis-
close non-native images or to localize the tampering, reaching
FD1 and FD2 in the forensic scale; FD3 has not been deeply
investigated but, as shown in literature, coding traces can
reveal something more than mere localization of the tamper.
Farid [25] shows that, when combining two images with
different JPEG compression quality, it may be possible to
recover information of the original compression quality of
the tampered region. A stronger compression in later stages
usually deteriorates the traces of previous compressions, com-
promising the effectiveness of these techniques. This technique
has been proved effective only if the tamper was initially
compressed at a lower quality than the rest of the image; on the
contrary, when the compression is stronger in the latter stage,
the traces of the first compression are probably damaged and
the detection fail.
This behavior is common in most forensic techniques based
on the analysis of multiple compression chains: stronger com-
pression in later stages ruins the traces of previous compres-
sion stages, making the tools ineffective. The analyst, when
using these tools, should take into account the reliability of the
results based on the coding characteristics of the investigated
image [26].
C. Editing Traces
Image editing modifies the visual information of the image
and the scene depicted, introducing traces in several domains
of the image such as pixel, geometric, and physical. Editing
traces are the most numerous, and can be split into subcate-
gories (Fig. 2) according to these domains.
Image illumination inconsistencies (light source direction,
cast and attached shadows) are powerful traces considering
that it is hard to achieve a perfect illumination match when
composing two images. The are two main approaches for
illumination techniques: geometric and illuminant. The first
are based on the geometric constraints of light, trying use
scene elements as cues to determine if the arrangement of
lights [27][28][29][30][31] or shadows [32][33] are plausible.
Illuminant techniques exploit the color, intensity and temper-
ature aspects of the illumination, and are able to detect if a
region or object in the image was lighted by a different type
of light [34][35].
Similarly, geometric relations within an image (e.g., object
proportions, reflections) are determined by the projection of
the 3D real scene onto the image plane. This process is
commonly modelled through the pin hole camera model [36].
Any deviation from this model can be exploited as evidence
of tampering. Yao [37] uses a perspective constrained method
to compare the height ratio between two objects in an image.
Without the knowledge of any prior camera parameter, it is
possible to estimate the relative height of objects and even-
tually identify objects that have been inserted on the scene.
An extension has been proposed by Iuliani et al. [38] to apply
the technique on images captured under general perspective
conditions. Conotter [39] describes a technique for detecting
if a text on a sign or billboard has been digitally inserted
on the image. The method looks if the text shape satisfies the
expected geometric distortion due to the perspective projection
of a planar surface. The authors show that, when the text is
manipulated, it is unlikely to precisely satisfy this geometric
mapping.
When an editing trace exposes evidence of forgery, we can
expect to infer something about its nature (FD3): if an object
has as shadow inconsistent with the scene, he was probably
inserted; if the illuminant color is inconsistent, the object could
have been either spliced or retouched.
Obtaining other specific information about the techniques
involved in the tampering process (FD4) is a very challenging
task. There are two main reasons for this. The development
of a technique for detecting the use of a specific tampering
process/tool may require a strong effort compared to its ap-
plicability in a narrow range. Secondly, proprietary algorithms
have undisclosed details about their implementation, making
hard to develop analytical models for their traces. A first step
toward this kind of assessment have been proposed by Zheng
et al. [40] to identify the feather operation used to smooth the
boundary of pasted objects.
IV. IMAGE COMPOSITION
The term “Image Composition” is used to encompass
different fields such as Computational Photography, Image
Processing, Image Synthesis, Computer Graphics and even
Computer Vision. Recent works on all of these fields were
surveyed to determine which ones could be used to aid in
forgery. For this purpose, techniques that a forger could use to
perform any form of operation were considered, from splicing
to highly creative operations.
The techniques were classified in five general classes based
on the type of forgery they could perform:
• Object Transfering: transfering an object or region from
one image to another image, or even to the same image.
This is the most common type of forgery, and encom-
passes both splicing and copy-and-paste operations. It is
divided into Alpha Matting, Cut-Out, Gradient Domain,
Structurally Changing, Inpainting, and Composition;
• Object Insertion and Manipulation: inserting synthetic
objects into an image or manipulating an existing object
to change its properties. It is divided into Object Inser-
tion, Object Manipulation, and Hair;
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• Lighting: altering image aspects related to lights and
lighting. It is divided into Global Reillumination, Object
Reillumination, Intrinsic Images, Reflections, Shadows,
and Lens Flare;
• Erasing: removing an object or region from the image
and concealing it. It is divided into Image Retargeting,
and Inpainting;
• Image Enhancement and Tweaking: this is the most
general class of forgery, and is related to what is
considered retouching on the forensics literature. It is
divided into Filtering, Image Morphing, Style Trans-
fer, Recoloring, Perspective Manipulation, and Restora-
tion/Retouching.
It must be noted that this classification considers forgery
from the point of view of both Image Composition and
Forensics. A composition technique that can be used to transfer
an object from one image to the other can also transfer it to the
same image. While those are distinct forgeries (and problems)
from the forensics point of view, they can be performed by the
same technique. Furthermore, some of the surveyed techniques
could be used to perform more than one type of forgery in
the classification. Erasing, for instance, is often performed by
copy-pasting regions of the image to conceal an object. In this
sense, a technique under the Object Transfering classification
can be also considered on the Erasing class.
In this Section, we discuss each of the different forgery
classes and their relation to the forensic traces and techniques.
Most information about the effect of composition on forensic
traces comes from performed tests (see Section V).
A. Object Transferring
This class contains techniques that can be used with an end
goal of transferring objects between images or in the same
image. A fundamental task of transferring an object or region
is defining its boundaries, and techniques that can help on
making good contours are classified as Cut-out [41][42]. These
techniques do not change the content from the source or target
images, they only aid in selecting a pixel area.
Most techniques to detect splicing or copy-and-paste are
well-suited against Cut-out forgeries, because the pixel content
is unaltered. From a forensics point of view, well-defined
boundaries on the transferred region reduce the amount of
information being carried from the original image. This might
alter some traces and affect the performance of techniques
based on those traces [43]. A bad cut can also be easy to note
visually, without the use of additional tools.
One of the main limitation of transferring objects by cut-
and-paste is that transparency is ignored. Hair, thin fabrics,
glass, and edges may contain a mix of colors from the
foreground and background of the source image. This can
cause visual artifacts on the resulting composition, and the
presence of foreign colors that can be used for traces. Alpha
Matting techniques can estimate the transparency of a region
in the image, which can be used to better extract it from the
source image, and then composite on the target image (Fig.
3e-h). The visual aspect is the most critical on the use of alpha
matting for object transferring, as it blends colors on borders
and transparent regions, making convincing forgeries. In our
tests, there was almost no difference between detecting Alpha
Matting or regular cut-out.
The most sophisticated object transferring techniques are
Gradient Domain ones. These techniques aim to combine the
gradient of the transferred object with the target image, making
a complex blend. The simplest technique is Poisson Image
Editing [5], which matches the gradients by solving a Poisson
equation from the boundaries of the transferred region. The
resulting object has different colors and gradient, blending
with the scene. Poisson Image Editing, also commonly referred
to as Seamless Cloning, spawned several works that improved
on its basic idea of solving differential equations for gradient
matching on transferred regions [44][45][46][47][48].
Most of the Gradient Domain techniques use Laplacian
Pyramids to manipulate the different image frequencies. Works
such as Sunkavalli’s [49], however, focus on the Laplacian
Pyramid as the main component for sophisticated blends
between images, being able to maintain the noise and texture
of the target image (Figures 3e through 3h) to some degree.
This kind of approach was generalized [50] and improved [51]
by other authors.
Gradient Domain techniques can be the most “dangerous”
for object transferring, from a forensics point of view. They
can blend the whole transferred area and merge the images
on a profound level. There are big variations on the inner
workings of each technique, and the results are very dependent
on the images to be combined. This means that it is hard to
evaluate them from a forensics point of view. A more specific
and thorough study is required to determine the exact effect of
compositing images on the Gradient Domain. In our tests they
were easily identifiable using compression and noise traces,
but these techniques have the potential to hide such traces if
finely tuned. The safest way to detect forgeries of this kind
would be focusing on high-level traces such as shadows and
geometry. Light-based traces could help on cases where a full
object is being transferred, because the resulting colors after
the blending may create irregular lighting. When transferring
parts of objects, such as changing faces on an existing head
(Figure 3d), it is possible that the result can have plausible
lighting and illuminant traces.
Object Transferring techniques are arguably the most rel-
evant to the forensics community, because they can be used
to perform both splicing and copy-pasting. Figure 3 shows an
Alpha Matting (top row), and a Gradient Domain (bottom row)
splicing. Both forgeries are visually unnoticeable. Notice how
the alpha matte (Figure 3g) contains very precise information
about the transparency of each hair, and the mixture of
colors on the final composition (Figure 3h). The Gradient
Domain composition exemplified does not use transparency
information (Figure 3c), but is able to transfer some of the
color and texture of the target image (Figure 3b) into the
transferred region of the source region (Figure 3a). The final
result (Figure 3d) is a very convincing composition.
B. Object Insertion and Manipulation
Images are 2D projections of a 3D scene, with complex
interactions of light and geometry. To insert a new object into
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Fig. 3: Example of splicing using object transferring techniques. The top row represents Alpha Matting, and uses the Shared
Matting technique [52]. The bottom row corresponds to Gradient Domain, and uses Multi Scale Harmonization [49]. The
source images are on the first column, the target images on the second colum, the transference masks are on the third column,
and the final result is displayed on the fourth column for each technique.
the image, or to manipulate existing objects, the properties
of the 3D scene must be known. This is a very challenging
task. Techniques under this category focus on estimating
characteristics of the 3D scene or its objects, providing means
to alter them on a visually convincing way.
Rendering a synthetic object into an image is a simple
task if the scene lighting and camera parameters are known.
Additional knowledge about scene geometry also helps to
increase realism. For this reason, this is the focus of most
object insertion techniques. The challenge is to obtain this
information from a single image. The most advanced tech-
niques for object insertion, developed by Karsch, are able
to estimate perspective, scene geometry, light sources and
even occlusion between objects. In [53] heavy user input was
needed to aid the parameter estimation, whereas in a second
work (Figure 1b) [7] most input tasks were replaced with
computer vision techniques to infer scene parameters.
The manipulation of objects in an image suffers from similar
problems than insertion. Scene lighting, camera parameters
and geometry are required for a visually convincing composi-
tion, and the geometry of the object being modified must be
also known. A slight advantage in relation to rendering syn-
thetic objects is that the photographic texture of the modified
object can be used, providing a more photo-realistic touch. It
is possible to perform resizing operations on objects without
directly dealing with its 3D geometry [54], but most techniques
will focus on modeling it.
The easiest way to work with the geometry of objects in an
image is to limit the scope to simple primitives. Zheng [55]
focus on cube-like objects, modeling them through “cuboid
proxies”, which allow for interactive transformations such as
scale, rotation, and translation in real time. Chen’s work [56]
uses user input to model an objects geometry through swipe
operations. This technique works specially well on objects that
have some kind of symmetry, such as a candelabrum or a vase,
and allows changes in the geometry itself. Another solution
for dealing with object geometry is to use a database of 3D
models, and find one that fits with the object depicted in the
image [57].
Manipulating human body parts in images is a specially hard
task, because human bodies vary greatly in shape, and clothes
affect the geometry. This type of manipulation, however,
is of special interest due to its applications in marketing
photography and modeling. Zhou [58] uses a parametric model
of the human body, and fits a photography to a warped 3D
model, achieving a correspondence between body parts in the
image and 3D geometry. This allows the reshaping of body
parts, making a person in a picture look thinner, stronger, taller,
etc. Hair manipulation is also a hot topic in image composition,
with a special focus on changing hair styles after the picture
has been taken [59][60][61].
Even though state-of-the-art techniques in image insertion
and manipulation can create visually convincing results, they
should not pose a problem for modern forensic techniques.
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Distinguishing between real and synthetic images is a very
debated topic [62][63][64], and there are forensic techniques
that focus on identifying them [65][66].
The weak point for this category of image composition is
in the acquisition traces. The process of rendering a syn-
thetic object is different from capturing it from a camera,
so the acquisition traces should point to the manipulation,
providing FD1 or FD2 results. Similarly, when performing
transformations on an object (scaling, rotating, deforming,
etc.), its pixels have to be resampled, changing the acquisition
traces. Resampling detection also could be used to obtain an
FD3 result in these cases, while compression-based techniques
could identify this type of manipulation if the original image
was compressed. Kee has demonstrated that object insertion
might be able to fool geometry-based lighting techniques [33],
which could also extend to object manipulation. The reason for
this is that the same lighting parameters estimated to verify the
integrity of the scene were used to generate the composition.
C. Erasing
An erasing manipulation is when an element of the image
is intentionally removed or hidden, and not a consequence of
other editing. This category is comprised mostly of Inpanting
and Image Retargeting techniques.
Inpainting techniques are used to complete a region in
an image, filling it with appropriate content [67]. By se-
lecting a region that one wants erased as the region to be
completed, inpainting can make objects disappear. Several
works on inpainting are focused on stitching different parts of
images together [68][69], or filling large gaps [70]. There are
implementations of inpainting techniques already available on
commercial editing sofware, such as Photoshop’s Spot Healing
Brush and Content Aware Fill tools. The main limitation
of inpainting is filling regions with high amount of details,
or using image features which are not local in the filling.
Huang’s [71] work is capable of identifying global planar
structures in the image, and uses “mid-level structural cues”
to help the composition process.
Image retargeting is a form of content-aware image resizing.
It allows to rescale some elements in an image and not others,
by carving seams in the image, i.e. removing non-aligned
lines or columns of pixels [72]. The seams usually follow an
energy minimization, removing regions of “low-energy” from
the image. The objects and regions that have seams removed
will shrink, while the rest of the image will be preserved.
This can be used to remove regions of the image by forcing
the seams to pass through certain places instead of strictly
following the energy minimization. Most research on image
retargeting focus on better identifying regions in the image to
be preserved, and choosing the optimal seam paths [73][74].
Erasing manipulations should behave in a similar fashion to
object insertion and manipulation, as the modified region will
not come from a photograph, but from an estimation. This af-
fects acquisition and compression traces, provided the original
images were compressed. Image retargeting has already been
analyzed from the point of view of image anonymization [75],
and there is even a specific technique for its detection [76].
Detecting that a seam carving has been done in an image
would constitute and FD4 in our scale.
D. Lighting
Lighting techniques are capable of changing the lighting of
scenes [77] and objects [78][79], inserting light effects such as
reflections [80][81], lens flare [82][83], and even manipulating
shadows [84][85][86]. From a forensics point of view, lighting
techniques are dangerous due to their potential of concealing
other forgeries. After splicing an object in an image, for
instance, a forger could add convincing shadows and change
its lighting, making it harder for both human analysts and
forensic techniques to detect it. Indeed, it is a concern in image
composition when the source and target lighting conditions
are different, and there are works focused on correcting this
issue [87][88].
Due to the variety of lighting techniques, it is hard to make
a general statement about them from a forensics point of view.
As always, it seems plausible that at least an FD2 result
can be achieved if compression is involved in the forgery.
Techniques that add shadows or change the lighting in a
visually convincing way, but do not account for all lighting
parameters of the scene, could fail to deceive geometry and
light-based forensics analysis. Specifically identifying light
inconsistencies is an FD3 in our scale.
E. Image Enhancement/Tweaking
This is a broad classification for techniques that perform
image modifications and are too specific to have their own
category. Image morphing techniques [9][89] can fuse objects
together, creating a composite that is a combination of them.
Style transfer techniques are able to transform an image to
match the style of another image [90], a high-level description
of a style [91], or an image collection [92][93]. In the same
vein, recoloring techniques can add or change the color of im-
age elements [94], and even simulate a different photographic
process [95].
Filtering techniques can be very flexible, allowing for a
wide variety of effects. They can be used to remove noise
or detail from images (Figure 1c) [96][97], or even to add
detail [8] while preserving edges. Different filters may be
designed to obtain different effects. From a forensics point
of view, filtering techniques can be used to remove low-level
traces. A simple median or gaussian filter is able to remove
compression and CFA traces, but it is easily detectable, as
it softens edges. Edge-aware filtering, however, can be used
to destroy such traces preserving edges. If used in a careful
way, it can remove the aforementioned traces in a visually
imperceptible way.
Perspective manipulation techniques allow an user to change
the geometry [98], and perspective [99] of a scene, or to
recapture an image from a different view point [100]. Its uses
are mostly artistic and aesthetic, but these techniques could
be used to forge photographic evidence. The final type of
manipulation that will be discussed is Retouching. Retouching
techniques aim to perform adjusts on image properties such as
white balance [101][102], focus [103], or several at the same
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time [104]. They can also aid in performing adjustments in
several images at the same time [105].
V. TESTING AND RESULTS
To understand how Image Composition techniques affect
forensics traces, we gathered images from several works and
performed a forensics analysis (Table II). The images used
were either obtained from the publication website or directly
from the authors. Our main goal was to analyze the images
directly before and after the techniques have been applied, to
understand how the traces are affected by it.
The images obtained have varying amounts of pre-
processing and compression. This influences the quality of the
analysis, making it harder to evaluate all cases with the same
standards. Obtaining all the implementation for the techniques
and generating controlled test cases could solve this problem,
but it is not feasible on an analysis of this scale.
As discussed in Section III, there are several techniques
based on each trace. Each technique has a different level
of success and scope. For this reason, our analysis is on
a higher level. We discuss the plausibility of four different
traces being used to detect a composition technique, rather
than the performance of each particular forensic technique. In
particular, a N/A result means there were no images for that
technique that could be tested for that trace. An example of
this would be compression traces when all available images
were uncompressed. An Indecisive result means that the tests
were inconclusive for that trace. This is probably due to
some form of pre-existing processing or compression that
made it impossible to evaluate the images for a particular
trace. A Plausible result means that there are indications of
editing or clear differences between the image before and
after the composition technique was used, but it is not clearly
identifiable. An Identifiable result means it is possible to
identify that some form of editing has occurred using that
trace. A Non-Identifiable result indicates that trace is not
suitable for detecting that particular composition technique.
The CFA analysis was done using the technique from [17],
which tries to measure the presence of demosaicing artifacts
at a local level onto the image. It is a fragile trace, as almost
any modification can destroy it. This means that it can be
really useful to decide if an image is not native (FD1) or
where it has been tampered (FD2) when the image is expected
to be pristine. Since the modification history of our images
was unknown, some test cases were inconclusive because the
demosaicing pattern had already been disrupted.
Unfortunately no information about source device were
available for any of the provided images. This limits the the
type of analysis that can be done, for instance using PRNU-
based analysis [18] to localize forgeries. Since the PRNU
is a prominent trace used in the literature, we designed an
experiment to test it. First, we captured a set of uncompressed
images with a Canon 5D to be able to estimate the noise
pattern. We were able to create compositions with the images
using Alpha Matting [52] and Edge-Aware Filtering [8], both
of which the implementation was easily available. In both
cases, the PRNU analysis was able to identify the forgeries.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4: Result of testing on Multi-Scale Harmonization (Fig-
ure 3d). On the left, aligned Double JPEG compression was
used. On the right, noise analysis. Notice that the suspect
region is an almost exact outline of the composition mask
(Figure 3c). In the original composited image (Figure 3d),
however, it is impossible to notice this discrepancy visually.
In Fig.5c we report an example to show its effectiveness on
localized recoloring. The blue region, representing a portion in
which the pattern noise is uncorrelated with the one estimated
by the camera, clearly localize the tampering.
Error Level Analysis (ELA) estimates the local compression
error for each JPEG block. This is a very low-level trace that is
common on forensics analysis tools, but requires a great deal
of interpretation and can be misleading [111]. It is, however,
an interesting analysis tool for our testing purposes. It allows
us to compare differences in compression for images before
and after the composition techniques were applied, rather than
measuring a specific trace. In our tests (Table II), several
techniques obtained a “plausible” result, which indicates that
compression traces could be used to detect them. In Fig. 5a
ELA is not able to identify any irregularity in the composed
image while, in both 5b and 5e the forgery introduces distinct
noise artefacts.
To evaluate double JPEG compression the technique
from [112] was used. The results are more straight-forward to
analyze than ELA, but its scope is more limited. It is specially
useful if a foreign region is inserted in an image (object trans-
fer/insertion). Reillumination (Fig. 5g) and seamless cloning
(Fig. 4a) were easily identified in our tests, and our evidence
indicates that the same could apply to Alpha Matting.
Noise analysis is very simple and subjective, but can be
very powerful. A median filter is applied on the image, and
the result is subtracted from the original one. The result is
then scaled according to the local luminance, and the noise
pattern is obtained. In essence, we are observing a combination
of sensor noise, illumination noise, compression noise, and
high frequencies. In natural images, the noise tends to behave
similarly in almost all of the image. When a region has a
distinct noise pattern (Figs. 5b and 4b), or strange artifacts
appear (Fig. 5e), it can be a strong indicator of forgery.
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TABLE II: Results for analyzing forensic traces in the sample images for composition techniques. Each composition technique
can be either Identifiable by using a certain trace, Non-Identifiable, or plausibly identifiabe. Indecisive means the traces were
already compromised in the tested images, and N/A that such trace could not be tested.
Composition Technique Images Tested CFA Double Jpeg ELA Noise
Soft Shadow Removal [6] 5 N/A Indecisive Non-Identifiable Identifiable
Dehazing [106] 9 Plausible N/A Indecisive Identifiable
Object Insertion [107] 9 Indecisive Non-Identifiable Identifiable Identifiable
Reillumination [10] 11 N/A Identifiable Plausible Plausible
3D Object Manipulation [108] 3 Plausible Indecisive Non-Identifiable Non-Identifiable
Image Morphing [109] 12 Plausible Plausible Plausible Identifiable
Alpha Matting [52][110] 9 Identifiable Plausible Plausible Non-Identifiable
Edge-Aware Filtering [8] 5 Identifiable Non-Identifiable Plausible Identifiable
Seamless Cloning [49][46][47] 16 Plausible Identifiable Plausible Plausible
The majority of tested composition types had at least one
identifiable trace. This means that forgeries done using these
techniques would probably be identified with a careful analy-
sis. In some cases, there is also the possibility of developing
a specific technique to detect them.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we surveyed both the fields of Image Compo-
sition and Digital Image Forensics, crossing them directly. A
new classification scheme for techniques in both fields, along
with a forgery detection scale were presented to help organize
the discussion. This scale provides a more sophisticated way
to compare the existing works on the literature, and assess the
capabilities of forensic techniques. To understand the forensics
aspect of composition techniques, their inner workings were
studied and tests were performed for a wide variety of image
effects. As a result, we uncovered that current state-of-the-art
forensics has all the basic tools it needs to be able to detect
most forgeries, provided that they are properly tuned for each
specific case, and maybe even combined.
This work is an overview of both fields, and can be used
either as an introductory reading, or as summary of the
current challenges. In this sense, we provide groundwork for
the development of novel forensic techniques against image
composition. A natural extension for this work would be
to increase the number of techniques surveyed and tested,
considering other traces and forensic approaches. Since both
fields are in an “eternal arms race” the list of available works to
be compared will keep increasing each year. We have shown,
however, that it is not trivial to fool a careful and thorough
forensic analysis.
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